

Securing Distributed Disaster Early Warning Networks

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Abstract—This paper proposes a secure and cost-effective communication and management approach for distributed disaster early warning networks to ensure reliable, low-latency alert dissemination. While decentralized architectures reduce latency by enabling direct device communication, they are highly vulnerable to attacks due to their exposure in public community settings and the challenges posed by Network Address Translation (NAT) and firewalls. Traditional NAT traversal techniques often lack the built-in security required for such sensitive infrastructure.

We identify Nebula, an open-source overlay networking tool, as a viable solution because it is lightweight enough for low-resource devices such as the Raspberry Pi typically found in decentralized early warning systems, supports NAT traversal, and provides end-to-end encryption. Preliminary experiments conducted in an AWS environment—designed to simulate real-world Raspberry Shake sensor deployments—confirm Nebula’s ability to establish direct peer-to-peer (P2P) connectivity with a single hop and effectively encrypt traffic.

Index Terms—Disaster early warning, Peer-to-Peer communication, Nebula, security, cost-effective

I. INTRODUCTION

Natural disasters have become a significant threat, causing severe damage to people and infrastructure [1]. Disaster early warning networks provide timely alerts, helping people take protective action before hazards. However, ensuring the reliability of these systems is essential, as false alarms can mislead the community.

Traditional centralized networks introduce an additional delay in communication, as data must pass through a central server before reaching the end device. Furthermore, if the central server is interrupted during a disaster, the entire network gets interrupted. Moreover, the high load at the central point of the network affects the performance of each device. A decentralized architecture overcomes these limitations by distributing data processing to end devices. In this decentralized model, sensors are installed at community houses and connected to the network using its available household internet connection. Exposure to the public environment makes devices vulnerable to third-party attacks leading to loss of trust on the early warning network. To ensure security in such community-based networks, sensors work behind Network Address Translation (NATs) and firewalls, making it challenging to establish direct peer-to-peer (P2P) communication between sensors. Several

NAT traversal techniques, such as hole punching [2], are used to connect devices directly. However, they do not have built-in security features to secure data communication from attacks.

Communication methods used in a community-based disaster early warning system should be able to penetrate firewalls and NAT to enable direct P2P communication, yet should have built-in security features. In some instances of real-world deployments of early warning systems, a mesh network of ground motion detection devices such as Raspberry Shake sensors are used as the end devices [1]. Hence, any security features should be implemented on such low-resource devices. Furthermore, this network should have self-healing ability during loss of connection and should be cost-effective to support large-scale community-based deployments.

In this paper, a cost-effective and secure communication method is proposed with an enhanced management approach for disaster early warning networks. Section II of this paper summarizes the existing solutions, and the proposed methodology and preliminary results are presented under Section III.

II. LITERATURE SURVEY

Implementation and testing of a decentralized earthquake early warning (EEW) system using MEMS-based Raspberry Shake sensors across New Zealand is reported in [1]. A novel SD-WAN technology, Zerotier [3], was used to establish P2P communication, which is based on UDP (User Datagram Protocol) hole punching. Experiments are conducted on multiple earthquake scenarios to measure the system latency. The paper concludes that the community-based EEW networks are technically feasible using Zerotier, which saves precious seconds in detection despite being costly.

Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC) is another communication method tested for P2P communication in EEW systems in [4]. QUIC was introduced by Google, and it is the foundation for the HTTP/3 protocol [5]. This reduces the round-trip delay by combining the transport layer stream abstraction, the encryption handling, and parts of the application layer into a single layer. The authors tested QUIC against Zerotier and concluded that a lower latency can be achieved with QUIC over UDP hole punching for P2P communication.

TABLE I
SUMMARY OF P2P COMMUNICATION METHODS.

Platform/Tool	Description	Open-source/Closed-source	Summary
Hamachi	Use STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT) servers to find the public IP and port of peers, and if direct connectivity fails, relay traffic via a TURN (Traversal Using Relay NAT) server	Closed-source	Wolinsky et al. [2] documented that Hamachi supports P2P communication using its central management and security infrastructure. But it disables users from hosting their own infrastructure.
Netbird	Based on WireGuard protocol and establishes a full mesh encrypted tunnel between devices. A web interface is available for the network administration.	Open-source	Vojdan et al [6] evaluated Netbird for a secure edge cloud continuum and concluded that it is suitable for high-performance and low-latency environments when the traffic is tunneled using UDP protocol but not for TCP
Tailscale	Built on WireGuard [7]. Establishes end-to-end encrypted direct connectivity between peers using minimal configuration. This uses STUN for NAT traversal and relay the traffic via DERP servers if the direct connectivity fails.	Client code is open source, but the control server code is closed	Imam Mehrab [8] evaluated Zerotier against Tailscale and concluded that, Zerotier outperforms Tailscale in terms of direct connectivity success rate, faster connection establishment, resource utilization, throughput, and lower latency.
Nebula	A software-defined networking (SDN) solution introduced by Slack [9]. Designed for high performance and automatic peer discovery, making it ideal for large-scale deployments.	Open-source	Carpio et al [9] investigated the Nebula for edge computing environments and concluded that it is a light-weight and reliable solution.
Zoom	Establish direct P2P connectivity using STUN and TURN servers. The coordination of direct connectivity establishment is performed via ICE negotiations. Dedicated servers are required for STUN/TURN servers.	Open-source	Andersson et al [10] evaluated the impact of NAT traversal on P2P communication and concluded that ICE negotiations add significant delay in direct connectivity establishment. And it does not encrypt the traffic.

However, more work is required before applying this in real-world deployments.

Although there are several P2P communication methods available in the literature, they have not been directly used for disaster early warning networks. Table I shows a summary of these methods.

Among the communication methods described above, Nebula is selected for further study as it is an open-source software capable of establishing direct P2P communication, lightweight to run on Raspberry Pi devices, provides data security by encrypting the traffic, and supports NAT traversal. Nebula is freely available on GitHub. It has a Certificate Authority (CA) to issue certificates for each client for authentication. For the initial connection setup, clients contact the lighthouse server to get details about the other clients. Once the information has been obtained from the lighthouse, clients can connect with each other directly [11].

III. PRELIMINARY TESTS AND RESULT

Our expectation is to evaluate and enhance Nebula's performance to meet the requirements of decentralized disaster early warning systems.

A. Proposed Implementation Setup

In the real-world disaster early warning networks, Raspberry Shake sensors are used as the end devices. Our experimental setup should be as close as possible to how Nebula would behave when implemented on Raspberry-pi devices distributed across an area.

The experimental setup is shown in Figure 1. It deploys client VMs across different AWS Availability Zones (AZs)—physically isolated datacenters—for network separation. A t4g.micro VM (ARM-based, low-cost Graviton2) type




Fig. 1. Proposed Implementation Setup.

is chosen to simulate a Raspberry Shake sensor behind unique public IPs and firewalls.

B. Preliminary Results

Initially, we tested Nebula's capability to establish direct P2P connectivity. After executing the Nebula on each client,

```
[root@ip-172-31-13-151 ec2-user]# ping 10.0.0.3
PING 10.0.0.3 (10.0.0.3) 56(84) bytes of data:
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=1 ttl=127 time=0.49 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=2 ttl=127 time=0.935 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=3 ttl=127 time=0.986 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=4 ttl=127 time=1.03 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=5 ttl=127 time=0.989 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=6 ttl=127 time=1.03 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=7 ttl=127 time=0.989 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=8 ttl=127 time=1.05 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=9 ttl=127 time=1.02 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=10 ttl=127 time=0.980 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=11 ttl=127 time=1.03 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=12 ttl=127 time=1.07 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=13 ttl=127 time=1.10 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=14 ttl=127 time=1.04 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=15 ttl=127 time=0.983 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=16 ttl=127 time=0.988 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=17 ttl=127 time=1.07 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=18 ttl=127 time=0.971 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=19 ttl=127 time=1.04 ms
```

Fig. 2. Ping Test Result.

we performed a *ping* test, and the *traceroute* result was also analyzed. *Ping* test is used to verify the destination device is reachable and to measure the round-trip time (latency). In the *ping* test results, the first round-trip value is comparatively higher as shown in Figure 2, and this occurs because the client contacts the lighthouse first for the initial peer discovery.

Traceroute tests help map the path an IP packet takes from source to destination. As shown in the Figure 3, the *traceroute* result contains only one hop. This confirms that Nebula has established direct peer-to-peer connectivity.

```
[root@ip-172-31-13-151 ec2-user]#
[root@ip-172-31-13-151 ec2-user]# ping 10.0.0.3
PING 10.0.0.3 (10.0.0.3) 56(84) bytes of data:
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=1 ttl=127 time=1.00 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=2 ttl=127 time=0.998 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=3 ttl=127 time=1.07 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=4 ttl=127 time=1.04 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=5 ttl=127 time=1.05 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=6 ttl=127 time=1.03 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=7 ttl=127 time=1.07 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3: icmp_seq=8 ttl=127 time=1.08 ms
^C
--- 10.0.0.3 ping statistics ---
8 packets transmitted, 8 received, 0% packet loss, time 7007ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.998/1.039/1.077/0.027 ms
[root@ip-172-31-13-151 ec2-user]#
[root@ip-172-31-13-151 ec2-user]#
[root@ip-172-31-13-151 ec2-user]# traceroute 10.0.0.3
traceroute to 10.0.0.3 (10.0.0.3), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
 1  ip-10-0-0-3.ap-south-1.compute.internal (10.0.0.3)  1.016 ms  1.000 ms  0.991 ms
[root@ip-172-31-13-151 ec2-user]#
```

Fig. 3. Traceroute Result.

Further, clear ICMP packets were visible on the Nebula interface, and there was no readable content on the physical interface, as shown in Fig. 4. This confirms that Nebula encrypts the traffic effectively.

```
[root@ip-172-31-13-151 ec2-user]#
[root@ip-172-31-13-151 ec2-user]# sudo tcpdump -i ens5 udp port 4242 -x
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[...], for full protocol decode
listening on ens5, (link-type EN10MB (Ethernet)) snapshot length 262144 bytes
17:47:03.543088 IP ec2-3-108-5-3.ap-south-1.compute.amazonaws.com.4242 > ip-172-31-13-151.ap-south-1.compute.internal.4242: UDP
P, length 1
000000: 4500 001a c190 4000 7a11 791a 036c 0503 E.....y..l.
000010: ac1f 0d97 1092 1092 0009 1093 0100 0000 .....
000020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
17:47:03.589924 IP ip-172-31-13-151.ap-south-1.compute.internal.4242 > ec2-3-108-5-3.ap-south-1.compute.amazonaws.com.4242: UDP
P, length 156
000000: 4500 0090 28ff 4000 7f11 12d1 ac1f 0d97 E.....f.....
000010: 0000 f7eb 1092 1092 007c c01a 1100 0000 .....
000020: 521a f6ff 0000 0000 0000 9139 730e 500e *.....5..
000030: 6ecd 563c a2a7 c8a3 d0ab 3520 c47d 5a30 n[.....5..]
000040: b04d 8076 c7a4 0554 700c ac1f 556a 510e P.....p.....
000050: 96a4 8e9f 7a30 351c 9e04 7731 5749 2450 .....45...1..
000060: 20e9 5508 871a 9e01 410e 0708 0148 9a9e S.....A.....
000070: 5740 3fed 76a8 a20a 50e3 b133 34aa 9a29 M[.....P..34..
000080: a559 5e0c 820b c049 48c2 815f d3a0 3f81 Y.....f.....
17:47:03.590041 IP ec2-3-108-5-3.ap-south-1.compute.amazonaws.com.4242 > ip-172-31-13-151.ap-south-1.compute.internal.4242:
2: UDP, length 156
000000: 4500 0090 6612 4000 7a11 d0d0 0000 f7eb E.....f.....
000010: ac1f 0d97 1092 1092 007c 000a 1100 0000 .....
000020: 211f 0a2a 0000 0000 0000 9139 8a7f 2063 .....
000030: 67fc 067c 0300 9fca 321a d5a0 aaaa 882f o.....2..
000040: 3a72 f2a2 762f 231f 98fb e72a 4f4d 8a1b [.....]
000050: .....
```

Fig. 4. Traffic Capture on Physical Interface.

IV. FUTURE WORK

Communication latency is a critical factor for a distributed disaster early warning network. We expect to perform latency tests multiple times at different times of the day over a specific period of time. Further, direct peer-to-peer connectivity, packet encryption, resource utilization, and the effect of encryption overhead will be tested. Client reconnection to the network after a network disruption will also be evaluated to ensure the self-healing ability of the network.

In the default Nebula setup, CA generates the client key and the client certificate files and sends them to the client over the internet. Due to the security vulnerability of sending the client key over the internet, we propose to generate the

key file within the client and send the public key file to the CA to sign.

Furthermore, after installing the relevant Nebula version, a configuration file needs to be executed on each device. Necessary changes should be made in this file to update the certificate and key file path, Nebula IPs, and lighthouse details. Editing this configuration file manually for each device is not possible in large-scale deployments. Therefore, we propose to automate the configuration file generation. In order to reduce the management complexities, we expect to build a management portal that enhances the visibility of the network.

Finally, the proposed system performance will be compared with the Zerotier by implementing and testing Zerotier in the same experimental setup under similar conditions. With that applicability of Nebula disaster early warning systems to ensure secure peer-to-peer communication will be evaluated.

V. CONCLUSION

The objective of this research is to propose a secure and cost-effective communication and management approach for distributed disaster early warning networks. This work-in-progress paper proposes Nebula as a cost-effective and secure communication method, and key findings from initial tests are summarized. Nebula is an open-source, secure overlay communication method and the preliminary results prove its suitability for disaster early warning networks. We propose future enhancements to the proposed solution fulfilling the key requirements of distributed disaster early warning systems.

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