Research Papers - Dept of Software Engineering

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Subject: search.filters.subject.Bounded rationality

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    PublicationOpen Access
    Disassortative mixing of boundedly-rational players in socio-ecological systems
    (researchgate.net, 2022-03-25) Ratnayake, P; Kasthurirathna, D; Piraveenan, M
    Bounded rationality refers to the non-optimal rationality of players in non-cooperative games. In a networked game, the bounded rationality of players may be heterogeneous and spatially distributed. It has been shown that the ‘system rationality’, which indicates the overall rationality of a network of players, may play a key role in the emergence of scale-free or core-periphery topologies in real-world networks. On the other hand, scalar-assortativity is a metric used to quantify the assortative mixing of nodes with respect to a given scalar attribute. In this work, we observe the effect of node rationality-based scalar-assortativity, on the system rationality of a network. Based on simulation results, we show that irrespective of the placement of nodes with higher rationality, it is the disassortative mixing of node rationality that helps to maximize system rationality in a population. The findings may have useful interpretations and applications in socio-economic systems in maximizing the utility of interactions in a population of strategic players
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Optimising influence in social networks using bounded rationality models
    (Springer Vienna, 2016-12) Kasthurirathna, D; Harre, M; Piraveenan, M
    Influence models enable the modelling of the spread of ideas, opinions and behaviours in social networks. Bounded rationality in social networks suggests that players make non-optimum decisions due to the limitations of access to information. Based on the premise that adopting a state or an idea can be regarded as being ‘rational’, we propose an influence model based on the heterogeneous bounded rationality of players in a social network. We employ the quantal response equilibrium model to incorporate the bounded rationality in the context of social influence. We hypothesise that bounded rationality of following a seed or adopting the strategy of a seed is negatively proportional to the distance from that node, and it follows that closeness centrality is the appropriate measure to place influencers in a social network. We argue that this model can be used in scenarios where there are multiple types of influencers and varying pay-offs of adopting a state. We compare different seed placement mechanisms to compare and contrast the optimum method to minimise the existing social influence in a network when there are multiple and conflicting seeds. We ascertain that placing of opposing seeds according to a measure derived from a combination of the betweenness centrality values from the seeds, and the closeness centrality of the network provide the maximum negative influence. Further, we extend this model to a strategic decision-making scenario where each seed operates a strategy in a strategic game.