Should the United Kingdom have a written constitution?

Abstract

A Constitution represents an indispensable facet of the organizational structure of a sovereign entity, encapsulating the foundational tenets and regulations that underpin its existence. A comparative analysis of the constitutional frameworks of the United Kingdom (UK) and Sri Lanka reveals a conspicuous distinction: Sri Lanka operates within the parameters of a Codified Constitution, while the UK lacks a Codified Constitution and instead relies on an amalgamation of statutory enactments, judicially established precedents, and regulatory provisions, constituting an Uncodified Constitution. This legal framework within the UK has elicited considerable discourse among scholars and entities advocating for the codification of the British Constitution. Proponents assert that codification would redress issues pertaining to the equilibrium of executive powers, enhance stability, and imbue clarity, thereby establishing a more perspicuous and unequivocal framework governing the foundational principles of the state. Conversely, detractors argue against codification, contending that it may foster conservativism and anti-rationalism within the Constitution, positing it as a potentially disruptive undertaking. The confluence of these perspectives has been further accentuated by pivotal events such as the 2016 EU referendum, subsequent EU withdrawal, and associated reforms. This article undertakes a meticulous examination and deconstruction of the ongoing discourse surrounding the potential codification of the UK Constitution.