Faculty of Computing
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Publication Open Access Disassortative Mixing and Systemic Rational Behaviour: How System Rationality Is Influenced by Topology and Placement in Networked Systems(MDPI, 2022-09-12) Kasthurirathna, D; Ratnayake, P; Piraveenan, MInterdependent decisionmaking of individuals in social systems can be modelled by games played on complex networks. Players in such systems have bounded rationality, which influences the computation of equilibrium solutions. It has been shown that the ‘system rationality’, which indicates the overall rationality of a network of players, may play a key role in the emergence of scale-free or core-periphery topologies in real-world networks. In this work, we identify optimal topologies and mixing patterns of players which can maximise system rationality. Based on simulation results, we show that irrespective of the placement of nodes with higher rationality, it is the disassortative mixing of node rationality that helps to maximize system rationality in a population. In other words, the findings of this work indicate that the overall rationality of a population may improve when more players with non-similar individual rationality levels interact with each other. We identify particular topologies such as the core-periphery topology, which facilitates the optimisation of system rationality. The findings presented in this work may have useful interpretations and applications in socio-economic systems for maximizing the utility of interactions in a population of strategic players.Publication Open Access Influence modelling using bounded rationality in social networks(acm.org, 2015-08-25) Kasthurirathna, D; Harre, M; Piraveenan, MInfluence models enable the modelling of the spread of ideas, opinions and behaviours in social networks. Bounded rationality in social network suggests that players make non optimum decisions due to the limitations of access to information. Based on the premise that adopting a state or an idea can be regarded as being 'rational', we propose an influence model based on the heterogeneous bounded rationality of players in a social network. We employ the quantal response equilibrium model to incorporate the bounded rationality in the context of social influence. The bounded rationality of following a seed or adopting the strategy of a seed would be negatively proportional to the distance from that node. This indicates that the closeness centrality would be the appropriate measure to place influencers in a social network. We argue that this model can be used in scenarios where there are multiple types of influencers and varying payoffs of adopting a state. We compare different seed placement mechanisms to compare and contrast the optimum method to minimise the existing social influence in a network when there are multiple and conflicting seeds. We ascertain that placing of opposing seeds according to a measure derived from a combination of the betweenness centrality values from the seeds and the closeness centrality of the network would provide the maximum negative influence.Publication Embargo Modeling networked systems using the topologically distributed bounded rationality framework(Wiley Online Library, 2016-11) Kasthurirathna, D; Piraveenan, M; Uddin, SIn networked systems research, game theory is increasingly used to model a number of scenarios where distributed decision making takes place in a competitive environment. These scenarios include peer-to-peer network formation and routing, computer security level allocation, and TCP congestion control. It has been shown, however, that such modeling has met with limited success in capturing the real-world behavior of computing systems. One of the main reasons for this drawback is that, whereas classical game theory assumes perfect rationality of players, real world entities in such settings have limited information, and cognitive ability which hinders their decision making. Meanwhile, new bounded rationality models have been proposed in networked game theory which take into account the topology of the network. In this article, we demonstrate that game-theoretic modeling of computing systems would be much more accurate if a topologically distributed bounded rationality model is used. In particular, we consider (a) link formation on peer-to-peer overlay networks (b) assigning security levels to computers in computer networks (c) routing in peer-to-peer overlay networks, and show that in each of these scenarios, the accuracy of the modeling improves very significantly when topological models of bounded rationality are applied in the modeling process. Our results indicate that it is possible to use game theory to model competitive scenarios in networked systems in a way that closely reflects real world behavior, topology, and dynamics of such systems. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 21: 123-137, 2016Publication Open Access Emergence of scale-free characteristics in socio-ecological systems with bounded rationality(Nature Publishing Group, 2015-06-11) Kasthurirathna, D; Piraveenan, MSocio–ecological systems are increasingly modelled by games played on complex networks. While the concept of Nash equilibrium assumes perfect rationality, in reality players display heterogeneous bounded rationality. Here we present a topological model of bounded rationality in socio-ecological systems, using the rationality parameter of the Quantal Response Equilibrium. We argue that system rationality could be measured by the average Kullback–-Leibler divergence between Nash and Quantal Response Equilibria and that the convergence towards Nash equilibria on average corresponds to increased system rationality. Using this model, we show that when a randomly connected socio-ecological system is topologically optimised to converge towards Nash equilibria, scale-free and small world features emerge. Therefore, optimising system rationality is an evolutionary reason for the emergence of scale-free and small-world features in socio-ecological systems. Further, we show that in games where multiple equilibria are possible, the correlation between the scale-freeness of the system and the fraction of links with multiple equilibria goes through a rapid transition when the average system rationality increases. Our results explain the influence of the topological structure of socio–ecological systems in shaping their collective cognitive behaviour and provide an explanation for the prevalence of scale-free and small-world characteristics in such systems.