Publication: Influence of Supply Chain Network Topology on the Evolution of Firm Strategies
DOI
Type:
Article
Date
2020-01-01
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Institute of Transport and Logistic Studies (ITLS)
Abstract
This study investigates the influence of the topological structure
of a supply chain network (SCN) on the evolution of cooperative
and defective strategies adopted by the individual firms. First, a
range of topologies representative of SCNs was generated using
a fitness-based network growth model, which enabled cross
comparisons by parameterising the network topologies with the
power law exponent of their respective degree distributions.
Then, the inter-firm links in each SCN were considered as
repeated strategic interactions and were modelled by the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game to represent the self-interested nature
of the individual firms. This model is considered an agent-based
model, where the agents are bound to their local neighbourhood
by the network topology. A novel strategy update rule was then
introduced to mimic the behaviour of firms. In particular, the
heterogeneously distributed nature of the firm rationality was
considered when they update their strategies at the end of each
game round. Additionally, the payoff comparison against the
neighbours was modelled to be strategy specific as opposed to
accumulated payoff comparison analysis adopted in past work.
It was found that the SCN topology, the level of rationality of
firms and the relative strategy payoff differences are all essential
elements in the evolution of cooperation. In summary, a tipping
point was found in terms of the power law exponent of the SCN
degree distribution, for achieving the highest number of cooperators. When the connection distribution of an SCN is highly
unbalanced (such as in hub and spoke topologies) or well
balanced (such as in random topologies), more difficult it is to
achieve higher levels of co-operation among the firms. It was
concluded that the scale-free topologies provide the best balance
of hubs firms and lesser connected firms. Therefore, scale-free
topologies are capable of achieving the highest proportion of cooperators in the firm population compared to other network
topologies.
Description
Keywords
supply chain network, Game theory, repeated games, Prisoner’s Dilemma, network science
